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Heterogeneity and the Provision of a Public Good in Leading 
and Lagging Regions 
Abstract 
The literature on leading and lagging regions has paid scant attention to how heterogeneity 
between the two regions impacts the provision of a public good. Given this lacuna, our contribution 
is to construct a game-theoretic model of an aggregate economy consisting of a leading and a 
lagging region and to then analyze this model. We show how two kinds of heterogeneity affect the 
provision of a public good such as higher education. In addition, we focus on decentralized and 
centralized public good provision and comment on the resulting welfare implications. We obtain 
two key conclusions. First, under decentralization, there exist several situations in which it is 
optimal for only one region to provide the public good. Second, under centralization, this exclusive 
provision is not optimal but the amount of the public good provided can be larger or smaller than 
the amount provided under decentralization. Our research tells policymakers that population size 
and values differences between the two regions and the use of majority voting are key factors to 
consider when pondering the optimal provision of a public good. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Preliminaries 
 Regional scientists and development economists have both been interested in studying the 
world’s so called leading and lagging regions for quite some time (Batabyal and Nijkamp 2014a, 
Lall et al. 2009). In fact, as recently as 2018, participants in the World Bank sponsored “World 
Urban Forum” commented on the urgent need for understanding the forces that separate leading 
and lagging regions.4 What are leading and lagging regions? Batabyal et al. (2019) helpfully 
explain that lagging regions are typically not dynamic, they are frequently rural or peripheral or 
remote, they are technologically backward, and they exhibit sluggish economic growth rates. In 
contrast, leading regions are more often than not dynamic, they are frequently urban and centrally 
located, they are technologically advanced, and they display relatively rapid rates of economic 
growth. 
The extant literature on leading and lagging regions (on which more in section 1.2 below) 
is substantial and growing. Even so, there are gaps in this literature. One such gap stems from the 
fact that this literature has paid virtually no attention to the many ways in which heterogeneity 
between these two types of regions affects the provision of public goods---such as infrastructure, 
sanitation, secondary and higher education, a police force---upon which both types of regions are 
frequently dependent. Therefore, research is currently needed to shed light on the ways in which 
(i) regional characteristics and (ii) alternate delivery methods affect the provision of public goods 
in these two types of regions.  
                                                            
4  
Go to https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2018/02/07/world-urban-forum for additional details on this point. 
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To this end, our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we construct a game-theoretic 
model of an aggregate and integrated economy that consists of a leading and a lagging region. 
Second, we analyze this model in detail. In our analysis, we pay particular attention to the 
following two questions: Given regional population differences and differences in how much 
citizens in the leading and in the lagging region value a public good, does it make more sense to 
provide the public good in a decentralized or in a centralized manner? In addition, what is the role 
of majority voting by the citizens of the leading and the lagging region in determining how best to 
provide the public good? This said, in order to appreciate how the research delineated in our paper 
might help policymakers ascertain how best to account for regional heterogeneity when providing 
a public good in an actual instance, it will be helpful for the reader to first get an adequate flavor 
for the kinds of questions that have been studied in the existing literature. Therefore, we now 
briefly survey this literature on leading and lagging regions.5  
1.2. Literature review 
As far as economic performance is concerned, what factors are most likely to connect the 
leading and the lagging states within India? This question has been addressed by Kalirajan (2004). 
He contends that the quality of the available human capital and infrastructure will together 
determine the extent to which there are growth spillover impacts from the leading to the lagging 
states. Does it make sense to use an endogenous growth model to study leading and lagging regions 
when the regions being studied are countries? Smulders (2004) first shows that it does and then 
proceeds to point out that capital market integration hurts (helps) the leading (lagging) region if 
                                                            
5  
The literature under review here has concentrated on many different parts of the world including India, Europe, Brazil, and 
Queensland, Australia. We begin with a discussion about states in India because the dissimilar economic performance of many of 
these states allows one to examine this performance in terms of the “leading-lagging” dichotomy that we are studying in this paper. 
That said, it is important to point out that the focus of this review is not specific to India in any way. 
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domestic spillovers are more salient than international spillovers and gaps in research and 
development (R&D) are small. What role do spatial spillovers play in either helping or hindering 
regional economic growth? Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2008) shed light on this question by 
concentrating on regions within Europe. These researchers use an empirical model of R&D, 
spillovers, and innovation and point out that even though they are subject to distance-decay effects, 
spatial spillovers are an important vehicle for transmitting economically productive knowledge.  
An issue of considerable interest to researchers is the potential for uneven development. 
Desmet and Ortin (2007) utilize a model with two regions and two sectors to analyze this issue. 
Interestingly, they show that the impact of technological change on either the leading or the lagging 
region is stochastic. The existence of this stochasticity leads these researchers to the surprising 
conclusion that in some scenarios, it may make sense for the lagging region to remain 
underdeveloped. Lall et al. (2009) and Becker et al. (2013) both address the role played by labor 
mobility in serving as a nexus between leading and lagging regions. Whereas Lall et al. (2009) 
focus on the migration decisions of working-age Brazilians, Becker et al. (2013) argue that the 
remote regions of Queensland in Australia are negatively affected by lengthy labor shortages. We 
learn that the existence of these shortages makes it very difficult to attract and retain labor. Hence, 
contend Becker et al. (2013), it will be incumbent upon businesses and communities to work 
together to reduce the problems created by these acute labor shortages.  
Can a so called “technology gap” between a leading and a lagging region influence their 
economic performance? Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014b) demonstrate that the answer to this 
question is “no” in the sense that the physical to effective human capital ratio is the same in both 
the regions on the balanced growth path (BGP). What can be done to ameliorate the economic 
performance of “strong” and “weak” regions? Dawid et al. (2014) point out that in order to answer 
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this question affirmatively, it will be necessary to concentrate on policies that promote technology 
adoption and improve the stock of human capital. Their analysis shows that the impact of such 
dual-purpose policies depends greatly on the extent to which the labor markets in the strong and 
in the weak regions are amalgamated.  
Several researchers have now utilized a modeling framework in which the object of inquiry 
is an aggregate economy composed of one leading and one lagging region. Two recent examples 
of studies that employ this framework are Batabyal (2018) and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2019). 
Specifically, Batabyal (2018) examines the nature of the spatial spillovers in his aggregate 
economy. He first solves for the Nash equilibrium levels of the local public goods in the two 
regions when public investment decisions are concurrent and then determines the equilibrium 
welfare level in each region. Finally and addressing a different question, Batabyal and Nijkamp 
(2019) demonstrate that relative to the leading region, the lagging region’s initial or time ݐ ൌ 0 
economic disadvantages are magnified on the balanced growth path. This completes our review of 
the kinds of questions that have typically been studied in the extant literature on leading and 
lagging regions. We now describe how the remainder of this paper is arranged and, at the same 
time, comment on the specific contributions of our paper.  
1.3. Schema and specific contributions  
To reiterate, the primary objective of our paper is to analyze the effects that two kinds of 
heterogeneity have on the provision of a public good such as higher education in an aggregate and 
integrated economy consisting of a leading and a lagging region. To this end, section 2 describes 
the game-theoretic framework. In this framework, the size of the populations in the two regions 
and the value that the individuals resident in these two regions place on providing the public good 
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in their region are dissimilar. Section 3 solves for the decentralized Nash equilibrium levels of the 
public good when the leading region is both larger and places a higher value on the public good. 
Section 4 studies the decentralized provision of the public good when the lagging region is larger 
but the value it places on the public good is lower. Section 5 examines the centralized provision 
of the public good in the aggregate economy with majority voting. Section 6 describes the welfare 
effects of centralization, first when the lagging region is larger and then when the leading region 
is larger. Section 7 provides some empirical evidence in support of the modeling framework used 
and conclusions reached in this paper. Finally, section 8 concludes and then discusses two ways in 
which the research delineated in this paper might be extended.  
2. The Game-Theoretic Framework 
 Our first assumption is that the aggregate and integrated economy under study consists of 
a leading and a lagging region. Following the nomenclature in Batabyal (2018), we denote the 
leading region with the subscript ܮ and the lagging or remote region with the subscript ܴ. Our 
second assumption is that in each of these two regions, there are two goods, a private good denoted 
by ݖ and a public good denoted by ݃. Our third assumption is that there are ݊௜ identical citizens in 
region ݅ and that ݅ ൌ ܮ, ܴ. The first kind of heterogeneity in our model stems from the stipulation 
that ݊ோ ് ݊௅.  
Our fourth assumption is that each citizen in the aggregate economy possesses a fixed 
amount of the private good and that this fixed amount can be converted into a public good at 
marginal cost equal to unity. The utility function of each citizen in region ݅ is given by 
௜ܷ ൌ ݖ௜ ൅ ߞ௜ logሺ݃ሻ,       (1) 
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where ߞ௜ ൐ 0 is a measure of the value6 that each citizen in region ݅ places on the provision of the 
public good in his or her region.7 The second kind of heterogeneity in our model arises from the 
proviso that ߞோ ് ߞ௅ . 
In principle, the public good in the two regions under study can be any one of several 
possibilities including, but not limited to, infrastructure, primary health care, sanitation, secondary 
education, higher education, and a police force. However, for concreteness, in the remainder of 
this paper we shall think of the public good as higher education. We now emphasize two points. 
First, we recognize that strictly speaking, higher education is not a pure public good because in 
either region, it is in principle possible to exclude some citizens from acquiring a higher education. 
That said, higher education does have many of the attributes of a public good---see Pasquerella 
(2016)---and it is likely to be underprovided because its social benefits generally exceed its private 
benefits. This is why we shall think of higher education as the public good in our model although 
we acknowledge that one can think of other examples well.  
Second, we use calculus to conduct our subsequent mathematical analysis. This means that 
it must be possible to vary ݃ continuously. As such, it is helpful to think of higher education as all 
post-secondary school education. When looked at in this way, varying ݃  means providing alternate 
levels of higher education such as a community college only, a community college plus a four-
year college, a community college, a four-year college, and a graduate institution, and so on and 
                                                            
6  
Later on, in sections 5 and 6 of our paper, we shall refer to this ߞ௜ or value parameter as a preference parameter. Put differently, the utility function in equation (1) can be thought of as a preference function and ߞ௜ is a value or preference parameter of the preference function. 
7  
The utility function in equation (1) describes the utility of any one citizen in each of the two regions under study. In this regard, 
note that since all citizens within a particular region are identical, it does not matter which citizen’s utility function we choose to 
conduct the analysis with. Second, since all citizens in a region are identical, to determine the utility of the entire region, we simply 
scale up using the population ݊௜ of that region. Equation (1) is an example of a quasi-linear utility function and several precedents exist for using such a utility function when analyzing one or more aspects of public goods. See Cornes and Sandler (1985) and 
Batabyal and Beladi (2019) for two examples. See Hindriks and Myles (2013, pp. 553-558) for a textbook discussion of quasi-
linear utility functions.  
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so forth.8 Our next task is to solve for the decentralized Nash equilibrium9 levels of the public good 
when the leading region is both larger and places a higher value on higher education.  
3. Public Good Provision with a Strong Leading Region 
 By “strong,” we mean that the conditions ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ and ݊ோ ൏ ݊௅ both hold. Now, each 
region independently selects how much of the public good to provide.. This means that the 
common level of the public good is the sum of the two regional provisions or ݃ ൌ ݃ோ ൅ ݃௅ .	 Let 
us denote the fixed endowment of the private good of each citizen in the leading region by ̂ݖ. Also, 
let us think of the ratio 1 ݊ோ⁄  as the per citizen marginal cost of providing the public good in the 
lagging region. Then, the utility of the lagging region as a function of the public good levels ݃ோ 
and ݃௅ is given by10  
 ܷோሺ݃ோ , ݃௅ሻ ൌ ̂ݖ െ ௚ೃ௡ೃ ൅ ߞோ logሺ݃ோ ൅ ݃௅ሻ.    (2) 
 
Differentiating the utility function in equation (2) with respect to ݃ோ , the first-order necessary 
condition for an optimum is 
 
                                                            
8  
We shall use the terms “public good” and “higher education” interchangeably in the remainder of this paper. Also, we emphasize 
the need to be clear about the following two points. First, since our analysis in this paper uses calculus, as noted earlier in the 
paragraph, it must be possible to vary the public good ݃  continuously. Hence, it does not make sense to view ݃  as a “discrete good.” 
Second, in economics, the utility function is typically defined over goods and not on the monetary value placed on these goods. As 
pointed out in standard textbooks such as Hirshleifer et al. (2005, chapter 3) and Hindriks and Myles (2013, chapter 6), this applies 
to both private and public goods. This is why we work with the physical public and private goods themselves ሺ݃, ݖሻ and not with 
any monetary amounts placed on these goods.  
9  
Loosely speaking, in a Nash equilibrium, every player in a game is doing the best that he or she can for himself or herself given 
that all the other players in this game are also doing the best that they can for themselves. For a technical definition of and more 
details about a Nash equilibrium, see Gibbons (1992).  
10  
Note that in writing equation (2), we have not changed “the functional form of equation (1).” As a result of the explanation given 
in this paragraph, ݖோ in equation (1) can also be written as ̂ݖ െ ݃ோ ݊ோ⁄  in equation (2). In addition, because ݃ ൌ ݃ோ ൅ ݃௅, the expression after the addition sign in equation (1) for ݅ ൌ ܴ is identical to the expression after the addition sign in equation (2). 
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డ௎ೃሺ௚ೃ,	௚ಽሻడ௚ೃ ൌ ఍ೃ௚ೃା௚ಽ െ ଵ௡ೃ ൌ 0.     (3) 
 
Simplifying equation (3), the reaction function of the lagging region is ݃ோ ൌ ߞோ݊ோ െ ݃௅ .       (4) 
Using a similar line of reasoning, the utility function of the leading region as a function of 
the public good levels ݃ோ and ݃௅ is  
 
௅ܷሺ݃ோ, ݃௅ሻ ൌ ̂ݖ െ ௚ಽ௡ಽ ൅ ߞ௅ logሺ݃ோ ൅ ݃௅ሻ,    (5) 
 
where, as in the case of the lagging region, we shall think of the ratio 1 ݊௅⁄  as the per citizen 
marginal cost of providing the public good in the leading region. Differentiating equation (5) with 
respect to ݃௅ , we get 
 డ௎ಽሺ௚ೃ,	௚ಽሻడ௚ಽ ൌ ఍ಽ௚ೃା௚ಽ െ ଵ௡ಽ ൌ 0.     (6) 
 
Simplifying equation (6), the leading region’s reaction function is ݃௅ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅ െ ݃ோ .       (7) 
 The two inequalities ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ and ݊ோ ൏ ݊௅ together tell us that ߞோ݊ோ ൏ ߞ௅݊௅. Inspecting 
this last inequality along with the two reaction functions in equations (4) and (7), it follows that 
the optimal provision of the public good in a Nash equilibrium is given by  ݃ோ ൌ 0	ܽ݊݀	݃௅ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅.      (8) 
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To understand the result in (8), recall two points. First, the marginal cost of providing the public 
good is lower in the leading region ሼ݊ோ ൏ ݊௅ ⇒ ሺ1 ݊ோሻ ൐ ሺ1 ݊௅ሻሽ⁄⁄  and the value placed on the 
public good in this region is also higher ሺߞ௅ ൐ ߞோሻ. Second, there is perfect substitutability in the 
two public good contributions. Therefore, in this case, it is optimal for only the leading region to 
provide higher education in our aggregate economy. Put differently, in the scenario studied in this 
section, there will be no higher education facilities in the lagging region.  
 We contend that the twin conditions ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ and ݊ோ ൏ ݊௅ appropriately characterize the 
population and the value placed on higher education in many of the world’s leading and lagging 
regions. If this contention is valid then our analysis thus far tells us that at least in some 
circumstances, the concerns of Kunaka and Arenas (2010), Goddard et al. (2012), and Pugh 
(2017), who have worried about the negative effects of poor educational facilities in lagging 
regions are largely misplaced. In fact, we have shown formally that when the leading region is 
larger, it places a higher value on the public good, and the public good contributions are 
characterized by perfect substitutability, it makes sense for this leading region to provide the public 
good exclusively. That said, this is not the only logical possibility. Therefore, we now analyze the 
decentralized provision of the public good when the lagging region is larger but the value it places 
on the public good is lower.11 
 
 
                                                            
11  
Note that in section 3, we have studied the case of a “strong” leading region meaning that ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ and ݊ோ<݊௅ both hold. That said, we are very interested in studying the provision of the public good in our aggregate economy when the preceding two inequalities 
do not both hold. That is why in section 4 we study the case of a “less strong leading region” where ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ but ݊ோ ൐ ݊௅ holds. Later on in the paper, in sections 5 and 6, we study the case where there is centralized provision of the public good in our aggregate 
economy. So, the point to note is that even though there is a leading and a lagging region in our paper, there are no “leader and 
follower dynamics.” Obviously, there can be no such dynamics with centralized provision of the public good. This is why the 
choices made in the two regions in sections 3 and 4 are simultaneous and not sequential. Put differently, this is why there is no 
Stackelberg structure in the model of this paper. Finally, the reader should note that the analysis of private or market-based provision 
of the public good is beyond the scope of our paper. 
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4. Public Good Provision with a Less Strong Leading Region 
 By “less strong,” we mean the conditions ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ and ݊ோ ൐ ݊௅ hold. Some thought ought 
to convince the reader that in this scenario, there are three possibilities to consider. The first 
possibility is when the condition ߞோ݊ோ ൏ ߞ௅݊௅ holds. When this happens, the provision of higher 
education is the same as that analyzed above in section 3. The second possibility arises when ߞோ݊ோ ൐ ߞ௅݊௅. When this happens, the logic of the section 3 analysis still holds but the Nash 
equilibrium is reversed in the sense that we now have  ݃௅ ൌ 0	ܽ݊݀	݃ோ ൌ ߞோ݊ோ.      (9) 
This means that the leading region ought not to provide any higher education and it is optimal for 
the lagging region to provide higher education exclusively.  
 The third and last possibility arises when the condition ߞோ݊ோ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅ holds. In this instance, 
we have a symmetric Nash equilibrium. From equation (4) we get ݃ோ െ ݃௅ ൌ ߞோ݊ோ . Similarly, 
simplifying equation (7), we get ݃௅ െ ݃ோ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅. Since the right-hand-sides (RHSs) of the 
preceding two equations are equal in this third case, we obtain ݃ோ െ ݃௅ ൌ ݃௅ െ ݃ோ ⇒ 2݃ோ ൌ2݃௅ ⇒ ݃ோ ൌ ݃௅ . In other words, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of interest, the two public 
good contributions satisfy  ݃ோ ൌ ݃௅	ܽ݊݀	݃ோ ൅ ݃௅ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅ .     (10) 
The reader will observe that of the three possibilities that we have analyzed in this fourth section, 
it is optimal for both the leading and the lagging regions to provide the public good only when the 
knife-edge condition ߞோ݊ோ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅ holds. Next, in section 5, we examine the centralized provision 
of the public good in the aggregate economy with majority voting.12 In other words, we depart 
                                                            
12  
See Hindriks and Myles (2013, p. 626) for a textbook discussion of voting and the provision of education. 
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from the decentralized provision of higher education and analyze the centralized provision of 
higher education in the aggregate economy with majority voting.  
5. Centralized Provision of the Public Good 
 In this case, the decision to provide the public good is made jointly for the leading and the 
lagging regions by a central authority. In addition, we suppose that majority voting determines the 
actual provision decision. This means that the provision of higher education is based on the 
preference of the median or larger region which turns out to be the leading region in section 3 and 
the lagging region in section 4. Note that although the centralized provision of higher education 
results in spreading the cost of provision more widely, at the same time, the preference of the 
larger region is imposed on the smaller region.13  
 Let us now ascertain the optimal provision of the public good in this centralized setting. 
As in section 3, when the leading region is the larger region, this region chooses ݃ based on the 
preference of the median leading region citizen given by ߞ௅ . So, the relevant optimization problem 
now involves choosing ݃ to solve 
 ݉ܽݔሼ௚ሽ	̂ݖ െ ௚௡ೃା௡ಽ ൅ ߞ௅ logሺ݃ሻ,     (11) 
 
and it is understood that the cost of providing the public good is now spread over the entire 
population ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ in the aggregate economy. Differentiating equation (11) with respect to ݃ and 
                                                            
13  
What matters for the provision of the public good now is that the preference of the median voter in the larger region is imposed on 
the smaller region. We remind the reader that as noted in footnote 3 in section 2, we are using the words value and preference to 
refer to the ߞ௜ parameter of the utility or preference function given by equation (1). In this regard, it should be noted that ߞ௜ is exogenous to the analysis we undertake in this paper and nowhere are we choosing the value of this parameter. 
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then setting this derivative equal to zero gives us the first order necessary condition for an 
optimum. We get 
 ఍ಽ௚ െ ଵ௡ೃା௡ಽ ൌ 0.       (12) 
 
Simplifying equation (12), the majority voting equilibrium provision of the public good is ݃ ൌ ߞ௅ሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ ൐ ߞ௅݊௅ .      (13) 
Comparing equation (13) with equation (8) we see that relative to the decentralized Nash 
equilibrium in section 3, more higher education is now provided in the centralized setting. Note 
that this result arises because the leading region---which values higher education more---ends up 
being decisive in the majority voting equilibrium and, in addition, the cost of provision is spread 
over all the citizens in the aggregate economy.  
 In the scenario studied in section 4, we had ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ and ݊ோ ൐ ݊௅ . Now focusing on the 
centralized provision of the public good with majority voting, the larger lagging region chooses 
how much higher education to provide. In this case, the lagging region will select ݃ based on the 
preference of the median citizen in the lagging region and this is given by ߞோ ൏ ߞ௅ . The 
optimization problem now involves choosing ݃ to solve 
 ݉ܽݔሼ௚ሽ	̂ݖ െ ௚௡ೃା௡ಽ ൅ ߞோ logሺ݃ሻ,     (14) 
 
where, once again, the cost of providing the public good is spread over the entire population ݊ ோ+݊௅ 
in the aggregate economy. Differentiating equation (14) with respect to ݃ , the first-order necessary 
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condition for an optimum and the majority voting equilibrium provision of the public good is given 
by ݃ ൌ ߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ.       (15) 
 To compare the centralized equilibrium provision described in equation (15) with the 
decentralized equilibrium provision discussed in section 4, it will be necessary to consider the 
three possibilities discussed in that section. First, if ߞோ݊ோ ൏ ߞ௅݊௅ then the centralized Nash 
equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium discussed in section 4 and we have  ݃ ൌ ݃௅ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅.       (16) 
Comparing equations (15) and (16), we see that with centralization, the optimal provision of higher 
education can actually decline if  ߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ ൏ ߞ௅݊௅ ⇔ ߞோ݊ோ ൏ ݊௅ሺߞ௅ െ ߞோሻ.   (17) 
The second possibility is that ߞோ݊ோ ൐ ߞ௅݊௅. In this case, the centralized Nash equilibrium 
is given by  ݃ ൌ ݃ோ ൌ ߞோ݊ோ .       (18) 
In this second instance, equations (15) and (18) tell us that for the provision of the public good to 
decline with centralization, we must have ߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ ൏ ߞோ݊ோ, which is clearly impossible.  
 The third and final possibility is that ߞோ݊ோ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅. In this case, the centralized Nash 
equilibrium provision of the public good is given by  ݃ ൌ ݃ோ ൅ ݃௅ ൌ ߞ௅݊௅ .       (19) 
For the public good provision in the centralized Nash equilibrium to be lower than the provision 
in the decentralized Nash equilibrium, we must have ߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ ൏ ߞ௅݊௅, which is also 
impossible. So, the basic finding that emerges from our discussion of the three possibilities is that 
the optimal provision of the public good can decline with centralization if and only if the condition 
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in (17) holds. Our final task in this paper is to delineate the welfare effects of centralization when 
first the lagging region is larger and then when the leading region is larger.  
6. Welfare Effects of Centralization 
 Consider first the case in which the lagging region is larger than the leading region, i.e., 
when ݊ோ ൐ ݊௅ . We know from equation (15) that the optimal provision of higher education under 
centralization is ݃ ൌ ߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ. As such, the welfare from the provision of the public good in 
our aggregate economy is  
 ܷோሺ݃ሻ ൅ ௅ܷሺ݃ሻ ൌ 2 ቄ̂ݖ െ ఍ೃሺ௡ೃା௡ಽሻ௡ೃା௡ಽ ቅ ൅ ሺߞோ ൅ ߞ௅ሻ logሼߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻሽ.  (20) 
 
After some algebra, the RHS of equation (20) simplifies to  ܷோሺ݃ሻ ൅ ௅ܷሺ݃ሻ ൌ 2ሺ̂ݖ െ ߞோሻ ൅ ሺߞோ ൅ ߞ௅ሻ logሼߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻሽ.   (21) 
 Next, suppose that the leading region is larger so that we have ݊௅ ൐ ݊ோ . The optimal 
centralized public good provision is ݃ ൌ ߞ௅ሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ and we also have ߞ௅ሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ ൐ߞோሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻ. Therefore, welfare in our aggregate economy is given by ܷோሺ݃ሻ ൅ ௅ܷሺ݃ሻ ൌ 2ሺ̂ݖ െ ߞ௅ሻ ൅ ሺߞோ ൅ ߞ௅ሻ logሼߞ௅ሺ݊ோ ൅ ݊௅ሻሽ.   (22) 
We now want to express the difference in the welfare in our aggregate economy, i.e., the welfare 
when the lagging region is decisive (is in the majority) less the welfare when the leading region is 
decisive (is in the majority). This difference is given by subtracting the RHS of equation (22) from 
the RHS of equation (21). Doing this, we get  2ሺߞ௅ െ ߞோሻ ൅ ሺߞோ ൅ ߞ௅ሻሼlogሺߞோሻ െ logሺߞ௅ሻሽ.    (23) 
Now recall that we have ߞ௅ ൐ ߞோ. This tells us that the first term in (23) is positive and that 
the second term is negative. The alternating signs of these two terms in the expression in (23) 
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describe the tradeoff between what we can think of as “preference matching” on the one hand and 
the “duplication of costs” on the other. The general ambiguity of the expression in (23) 
notwithstanding, it is possible to shed more light on this expression in some special cases. To 
illustrate this point, we now focus on one particular case. Suppose that  
 ఍ಽି఍ೃ఍ೃା఍ಽ ൐ ቚଵଶ log	ቀ఍ೃ఍ಽቁቚ.       (24) 
 
In words, the ratio on the left-hand-side (LHS) of (24) is larger than the absolute value of the 
logarithmic term on the RHS. In this case, the difference in welfare is positive when the lagging 
region, which places a lower value on higher education but is larger, is decisive and hence can 
impose its preference about the provision of higher education in the aggregate economy. This 
completes our game-theoretic analysis of heterogeneity and the provision of a public good in 
leading and lagging regions.  
7. Empirical Evidence 
 We have worked with a theoretical framework that looks at a leading and a lagging region 
as a part of an aggregate economy or, put differently, as an integrated whole. In particular, we have 
avoided analyzing either a leading or a lagging region in isolation. This line of thinking is entirely 
consistent with the position taken in the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report: 
Reshaping Economic Geography. As pointed out by Lall et al. (2009, p. 152), this report clearly 
contends “that policies should focus on integrating lagging and leading regions---and not be 
exclusively concerned with stimulating growth in lagging regions.”  
 Second, we have emphasized the importance of heterogeneity in our modeling framework 
and have studied two kinds of heterogeneity. Specifically, the leading and the lagging regions in 
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our model are different in terms of their populations and in terms of the values they place on the 
public good under study. Lall’s (1999, p. 723) empirical work on leading and lagging regions in 
India supports our emphasis; he notes that “leading…and lagging regions are not homogeneous 
but are structurally different and need to be examined separately.” Similarly, Rodriguez-Pose and 
Wilkie (2019, p. 5) point out that “No two regions, lagging or otherwise, are identical; they differ 
along socioeconomic, political, structural, and institutional lines.” 
 Finally, we have pointed to the importance of providing public goods in leading as well as 
in lagging regions although, as our analysis shows, how much is provided depends on the specific 
nature of the provision decision. The empirical work of Lall (1999) on leading and lagging regions 
in India supports this perspective. He demonstrates that the provision of public goods (in his case 
economic infrastructure) “[appears] to influence economic productivity and social welfare…” (p. 
719). For other conceptual and empirical studies that describe the importance of public goods for 
leading and particularly lagging regions, the reader should consult Liu (2016), OECD (2018), and 
Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2019).  
8. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we analyzed how two kinds of heterogeneity affected the decentralized and 
the centralized provision of a public good such as higher education in an aggregate economy 
consisting of a leading and a lagging region. Specifically, the size of the populations in the two 
regions and the value individuals in these two regions placed on providing the public good in their 
region were dissimilar. We obtained two basic conclusions. First, under decentralization, there 
existed several circumstances in which it was optimal for only one region to provide the public 
good. Second, under centralization, this exclusive provision was not optimal but the amount of the 
public good provided could be larger or smaller than the amount provided under decentralization.  
19 
 
 Our research tells policymakers to be cognizant of two key points. First, when pondering 
the provision of a public good in an aggregate and integrated economy, it is important to consider 
the administrative level at which the decision is being made. In centralized provision, majority 
voting makes sense but the use of this procedure will “shut out” the wishes of the smaller (in 
population) region. Second, in decentralized provision, so called “corner solutions” in which one 
regions gets none of the public good can arise. In fact, a scenario in which a lagging region is 
characterized by a “corner solution” may be of some concern because this may be indicative of the 
continued dependence of the lagging region on the leading region.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are two 
potential extensions. First, it would be useful to analyze the provision of a public good such as 
higher education in a model of an aggregate economy with at least three regions and where citizens 
are able to migrate between these regions when they believe there are quality differences in the 
public good across the different regions. Second, it would also be helpful to model regional 
characteristics in addition to differential population sizes and public good valuations to see how 
these additional attributes influence the provision of a particular public good. Studies that analyze 
these aspects of the underlying problem about economic differences between leading and lagging 
regions will provide additional insights into the nexuses between remote versus central location 
on the one hand and the efficient provision of public goods on the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
References 
Batabyal, A.A. 2018. A note on local public good induced spillovers between a leading and a 
lagging region, Regional Science Inquiry, 10, 11-16. 
Batabyal, A.A., and Beladi, H. 2019. The optimal provision of information and communication 
technologies in smart cities, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 147, 216-220. 
Batabyal, A.A., Kourtit, K., and Nijkamp, P. 2019. New technological knowledge, rural and urban 
agriculture, and steady state economic growth, Networks and Spatial Economics, 19, 717-
729. 
Batabyal, A.A., and Nijkamp, P. 2014a. Technology, learning, and long run economic growth in 
leading and lagging regions, Economic and Political Weekly, 49, 92-96. 
Batabyal, A.A., and Nijkamp, P. 2014b. Some properties of the technology gap between leading 
and lagging regions, Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 1-6. 
Batabyal, A.A., and Nijkamp, P. 2019. The magnification of a lagging region’s initial economic 
disadvantages on the balanced growth path. Forthcoming, Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional 
Science. 
Becker, K., Hyland, P., and Soosay, C. 2013. Labour attraction and retention in rural and remote 
Queensland communities, Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, 19, 342-368. 
Cornes, R., and sandler, T. 1985. The simple analytics of pure public good provision, Economica, 
52, 103-116. 
Dawid, H., Harting, P., and Neugart, M. 2014. Economic convergence: Policy implications from 
a heterogeneous agent model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 44, 54-80. 
Desmet, K., and Ortin, I.O. 2007. Rational underdevelopment, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 109, 1-24. 
21 
 
Dittmar, J.E., and Meisenzahl, R.R. 2019. Public good institutions, human capital, and growth. 
Forthcoming, Review of Economic Studies. 
Gibbons, R. 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, UK. 
Goddard, J., Robertson, D., and Vallance, P. 2012. Universities, technology and innovation centers 
and regional development: The case of the north-east of England, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 36, 609-627. 
Hindriks, J., and Myles, G.D. 2013. Intermediate Public Economics, 2nd edition. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Hirshleifer, J., Glazer, A., and Hirshleifer, D. 2005. Price Theory and Applications, 7th edition. 
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. 
Kalirajan, K. 2004. Economic reform and the transmission of growth impulses across Indian 
states, International Journal of Social Economics, 31, 623-636. 
Kunaka, C., and Arenas, G. 2010. Logistics in lagging regions, Report Number 58852, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
Lall, S.V. 1999. The role of public infrastructure investments in regional development, Economic 
and Political Weekly, 34, 717-725. 
Lall, S.V. Timmins, C., and Yu, S. 2009. Connecting lagging and leading regions: The role of 
labor mobility, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 151-174. 
Liu, A. 2016. Remaking Economic Development: The Markets and Civics of Continuous Growth 
and Prosperity. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
OECD. 2018. Rural 3.0. A Framework for Rural Development. OECD, Paris, France. 
22 
 
Pasquerella, L. 2016. Higher education should be a public good, not a private commodity, The 
Washington Post, October 20. 
Pugh, R. 2017. Universities and economic development in lagging regions: ‘triple Helix’ policy 
in Wales, Regional Studies, 51, 982-993. 
Rodriguez-Pose, A., and Crescenzi, R. 2008. Research and development, spillovers, innovation 
systems, and the genesis of regional growth in Europe, Regional Studies, 42, 51-67. 
Rodriguez-Pose, A., and Wilkie, G. 2019. Innovating in less developed regions: What drives 
patenting in the lagging regions of Europe and North America, Growth and Change, 50, 4-
37. 
Smulders, S. 2004. International capital market integration: Implications for convergence, growth, 
and welfare, International Economics and Economic Policy, 1, 173-194. 
World Bank. 2009. World Development Report: Reshaping Economic Geography. Oxford 
 University Press, Oxford, UK.  
